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Abstract 
This  study  is  motivated  by  the  proposition that  the  objectives  of the AWB Ltd have 
changed  since  semi-privatisation  of  the  Australian  Wheat  Board  under  the  Wheat 
Marketing Act, 1989.  Conceptualising this change of objectives as a shift from revenue 
maximization to profit maximization, this study examines the impact of such a change on 
the pricing policies of a multi-market price-setting firm. More specifically, this paper 
investigates,  using  two  hypothetical  objective  functions,  a  risk  averse  AWB’s  price-
setting behaviour in an “overseas” and a “domestic” market in response to recent wheat 
industry  developments.  In  the  analysis  these  developments  manifest  themselves  as 
differing price elasticities, differing transport costs and uncertain demand functions, and 
their implications particularly for the prices paid by domestic consumers are explored. 
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Introduction 
Historically,  the  Australian  Wheat  Industry  has  been  the  beneficiary  of  considerable 
government-funded support. However, commencing with the cessation of the Guaranteed 
Minimum Price Scheme in 1989 this support has been in the process of being removed, 
with the aim of leaving the industry exposed to economic realities. Over this period a 
central player in the Industry has been the former Australian Wheat Board (AWB), and its 
activities have been particularly targeted in relation to the removal of government-funded 
support and the encouragement to adopt fully commercial practices. 
 
In this context the changes imposed on the AWB have been similar to those imposed by 
governments on former public enterprises in the privatisation process. This process has 
been the subject of a considerable economics literature, with one of the interests of this 
literature being the impact of privatisation on the objectives of the firm, and consequently 
on its behaviour (Fraser, 1989; Vickers & Yarrow, 1989; Bishop et al., 1994; Fraser, 
1991; Fraser, 1994(a) and Fraser, 1996). However, one key difference is that whereas the 
privatisation  of  public  enterprises  that  retain  considerable  monopoly  power  has  been 
associated with post-privatisation regulation of their behaviour, typically of the “price-
cap”  variety,  the  AWB  Ltd,  by  virtue  of  trading  across  national  boundaries,  is  not 
subjected to such price regulation.  
 
This  observation  raises  the  question  of  whether  an  examination  of  the  AWB  Ltd’s 
situation using the methods of the privatisation literature might reveal insights regarding 
how its behaviour is likely to have been modified by the removal of government-funded 
support to the Industry. The aim of this paper is to undertake such an analysis, focusing in 
particular on how the government’s push of the AWB towards fully commercial practices 
can be expected to have affected its pricing behaviour. 
 
The  structure  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  1  provides  a  background  to  the 
privatisation issues in Australia.  In Section 2 the model is developed and a base case 
scenario is devised with the initial results of the numerical analysis reported.  Section 3   3 
outlines  several recent  Australian  wheat  industry  developments.    These developments 
have occurred over the last decade (1990s), and include:  deregulation of the Australian 
wheat  market;  changes  in  domestic  and  export  transport  costs;  and  developments  in 
international stability.  These changes are imposed on the hypothetical data used in the 
original  model  to  determine  how  pricing  behaviour  differs  from  the  base  case.    The 
results for each scenario are then analysed and conclusions drawn. 
 
Section 1:   Background 
Microeconomic  reform  and  the  process  of  privatisation  has  been  a  Western  political 
phenomenon  of  the  last  three  decades.  Following  from  the  challenge  of  the  classical 
economist’s ‘laissez faire’ policies rose Keynesianism and the ‘mixed economy’.  The 
breakdown  of  Keynesian  economic  policy  during  the  1970s,  coupled  with  the  1979 
recession, lead to a push towards microeconomic reform as a means to remove focus from 
the macroeconomic problems of the day (Quiggin, 1996, p 11).   
  
The  US  and  the  UK  began  to  deregulate  key  industries,  such  as  telecommunications 
industries, during the early 1980s. The US’ reforms were ultimately limited to the airline, 
road and telecommunications industry, however the UK, under the Thatcher government, 
began to embrace the concept of privatisation (Quiggin, 1996, p 12). At the same time, 
international financial deregulation was hastened by the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement of fixed exchange rates.   
 
Deregulation in Australia began with the Whitlam government’s 25% across-the-board 
tariff  slash  in  1973.    Microeconomic  reform  continued  with  the  establishment  of  an 
Industries Assistance Commission (now the Productivity Commission), and in 1980 a 
“the first systematic program of microeconomic reform was presented in Australia at the 
Crossroads:  Our Choices to the Year 2000 by Kasper, Blandy, Freebairn, Hocking and 
O’Neill” (Quiggin, 1996, p 1).  This paper presented a ‘libertarian’ and a ‘mercantilist’ 
path, which differed in their objectives and were supported by proponents for and against 
microeconomic  reform  (see  table  1.1.1).    Kasper  et  al.,  suggested  the  mercantilist   4 
approach to be the most direct of the two, however, it has been the libertarian path that 
has been chosen - a slightly slower option (Quiggin, 1996, p 2).   
 
Table 1.1.1:  Libertarian  and  mercantilist  approaches  to  microeconomic  reform  in 
Australia. 
Libertarian  Mercantilist 
Free international trade;  Protection against import protection; 
Acceptance  of  structural  changes  wrought  by  new 
technologies; 
Protection  against  changes  wrought  by  new 
technologies; 
Elimination  of  restrictions  on  international  capital 
flows and competitive domestic capital markets; 
Maintenance of restrictions on capital inflows and 
competitive capital markets; 
Variation of wages in response to market forces;  Defense of a rigid system of occupational and real 
wages; 
Reduction  in  the  government’s  benevolent  role  in 
service provision; 
Continuation  of  provisions  by  a  benevolent 
government (e.g. health, education & welfare); 
Application of antimonopoly legislation and market 
deregulation; 
Government by lobbying; 
Expansion of the government’s role as a provider of 
income maintenance. 
Consumerism  and  environmentalism  supported  by 
bureaucratic regulation. 
Source:  Kasper et al., 1980, pp 182-211, in Quiggin, 1996, pp 1-2. 
 
The Labour government in Australia embraced microeconomic reform in the late 1980s, 
against the grain of traditional Labour policies of state ownership, and Australia joined 
the international bandwagon of deregulation and privatisation. 
 
From  this  point  on,  microeconomic  reform  proceeded  rapidly.    The  main 
recommendations of the Campbell Committee were implemented in 1986.  By 1988, the 
government had committed itself to a general reduction in tariffs, and to the privatisation 
of enterprises such as the Commonwealth Bank.  In 1990 the two-airlines agreement 
came to an end and the basis was laid for competition in telecommunications. 
(Quiggin, 1996, p 28). 
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In 1995, following the Hilmer Report (1993), the National Competition Policy Act (1995) 
was  ratified  by  the  Council  of  Australian  Governments  (COAG).    This  Act  saw  the 
creation  of  the  Australian  Competition  and  Consumer  Commission  and  the  National 
Competition  Council (NCC).  The aim of the NCC is “to supervise  the progress of 
federal and state governments towards implementation of competitive reform” (Quiggin, 
1996,  p  29).   Since its establishment, the NCC has endorsed many industry reviews, 
including the 2000 Review of the Wheat Marketing Act. 
 
Section 2:  The Model 
The model developed in this section is based on that outlined in Fraser (1989) of a size-
orientated price-setting firm operating in multiple markets. In that case little was done to 
specify the firm’s alternative markets other than for them to differ in terms of the extent 
to which  demand  was  uncertain.  In  this  case,  in  order  to  characterize  more  fully the 
differences between the AWB’s domestic and overseas markets, the following market-
based assumptions are made: 
 
   (a)  the product is a homogenous good;  
(b)  three  markets  exist:  “overseas”,  “domestic”  and  residual  production 
(“dump market”) in which revenue just covers costs; 
(c)  costs to supply are greater in the overseas market than the domestic;  
(d)  demand  in  the  overseas  market  is  more  elastic  than  in  the  domestic 
market;  
(e)  demand  in  the overseas  market is more uncertain than in the domestic 
market. 
 
Regarding the specification of the firm’s objective, based on Fraser (1989), it is assumed 
that “before” commercialisation the objective of the firm is to maximize the expected 
utility of sales revenue (EU(Rev)T) subject to an expected profit constraint (E(Õ )T) and a 
total production constraint (Q ). Note that in what follows consideration of revenue from 
the sale of residual production is omitted in order to simplify the analysis. In this context   6 
it can be shown that because the firm’s pricing behaviour is always constrained, this 
residual revenue source has a negligible effect on behaviour, even if the firm is very risk 
averse. In this case the firm’s objective is given by:  
  Max   ) (Rev EU T                …(1) 
 
By choice of  overseas (po) and domestic (pd) prices. 
Subject to: 
    x d o q q E q E Q + + = ) ( ) (             …(2) 
 
and, 
    E(Õ)T ³ z                …(3) 
       
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( d d d d o o o o T q E c q E p q E c q E p E - + - = Õ      …(4)   
 
where:   E(qo) = expected sales in the overseas market; 
                   E(qd) = expected sales in the domestic market; 
                    qx = sales of residual production; 
                      co = costs of supply per unit to the overseas market; 
                       cd = costs of supply per unit to the domestic market; 
                        z = minimum feasible expected profit level. 
 
Demand in both the overseas and domestic markets is assumed to be characterised by 
constant elasticity (bi) demand functions subject to additive uncertainty (ui, where i is 
either o or d). 
    i
b
i i i u p a q
i + =
-               …(5) 
and where price is chosen as an optimal mark-up (l ) on per unit costs of supply: 
      pi =(1+li)ci               …(6) 
where: 
                  ai = scaling factor in each market                    7 
                 E(ui)= 0                 
 
and demand is assumed to be uncorrelated in the two markets. 
As a consequence:   
   
i b
i i i p a q E
- = ) (               …(7) 
  
and expected revenue (E(Rev)T) is given by: 
 
    ) ( ) ( ) (Re d d o o T q E p q E p v E + =            …(8) 
 
While the variance of revenue (Var(Rev)T) is given by: 
 
    Var(Rev)T = po
2Var(uo)+ pd
2Var(ud)        …(9) 
where:  
              Var(ui) = variance of demand in each market. 
 
On  this  basis,  using  the  mean-variance  specification  of  expected  utility,  the  firm’s 
objective is to maximize
1:  
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2
1
) ) (Re ( ) (Re + =     …(10) 
Subject to: 
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and, 
E(Õ)T ³ z           
 
                                                 
1 See Hanson & Ladd, 1991 for empirical support for this assumption.   
   8 
E(Õ)T = (poE(qo) - coE(qo))+ (pdE(qd) - cdE(qd)      …(12) 
 
The first order conditions for the optimal prices, subject to the expected profit and total 
production constraints are as follows: 
 
[ ] [ (Re * )) (Re (
2
1
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2
1
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                      …(13) 
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b q E c v E
= ¢
- = ¢
          …(14) 
                  …(15) 
The “after” commercialisation situation is assumed to be represented by a focus on profit 
rather than revenue, in which case the firm’s objective is to maximize the expected utility 
of profit, subject only to the total production constraint (Fraser, 1994(a)). 
 
    Max  T EU ) (Õ               …(16) 
 
Subject to:  
x d o q q E q E Q + + = ) ( ) (             …(17) 
        
Using the same specification of the demand functions, expected profit is given by: 
 
    E(Õ)T = poE(qo) + pdE(qd)- coE(qo) - cdE(qd)      …(18) 
 
 
and the variance of profit is given by: 
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Var(Õ)T = (po - co)
2Var(uo) + (pd - cd)
2Var(ud)      …(19) 
 
Once again using the mean-variance formulation gives: 
 
Max  T T T T Var E U E U EU ) ( ) ) ( (
2
1
) ( ( ) ( Õ Õ ¢ ¢ + Õ = Õ     …(21) 
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x d o q q E q E Q + + = ) ( ) (             …(22) 
 
On  this  basis,  the  first  order  conditions  for  the  optimal  prices  subject  to  the  total 
production constraint are given by: 
  
[ ] [ ] ) ( * )) ( (
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 In order to undertake a numerical analysis of the model developed it is necessary to 
specify a functional form for the firm’s utility function, and a set of base case parameter 
values. In what follows, use is made of the constant relative risk aversion utility function 
(see Fraser 1994a and b). On this basis, total utility for the “before” commercialisation 
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1
            …(26)   10 
 
And in the “after” commercialisation case, the firm’s utility is given by: 
 








             …(27) 
The  parameter  values  used  for  the  ‘base  case’  in  the  numerical  analysis  (using 
hypothetical data) are as follows: 
Overseas Market    Domestic Market    Residual Market 
ao = 10000      ad = 10000      p  x= cx = 1 
bo = 1.5      bd = 1.3      Q = 240 
co = 15       cd = 10 
uo = 500      ud = 100 
 
Note  the  relative  risk  aversion  coefficient
2  is  set  at  R  =  0.5  and  the  expected  profit 
constraint (z) for the expected utility of revenue maximiser is assumed to be 95% of that 
achieved by the expected utility of profit maximiser. This is an arbitrary assumption, 
which is made for simplicity, and in order to keep the two types of pricing behaviour 
“close” to each other. The role of this constraint is discussed further in what follows. 
  
 
                                                 
2 It might be expected that the AWB Ltd’s attitude to risk (R) would also change with commercialisation. 
However, previous numerical analysis of this model suggests that the pattern of results is insensitive to the 
assumed value of R (see Lobb and Fraser, 2002, for details). 
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Table 2.1.1:   Full model version* 




     
po  $32.90  $41.03 
pd  $27.30  $42.49 
QT  188.83  114.48 
E(P P P P)Total  $3298.32  $3473.42 
 
From the initial numerical analysis of the sensitivity of the relative prices and quantities 
in Table 2.1.1 (Lobb & Fraser, 2002) three hypotheses were developed
3:  
 
H1:  ) (Re ) ( v p p o o > Õ  
 
H2:  ) (Re ) ( v p p d d > Õ  
 
H3:  QT(Õ) < QT(Rev) 
                                                 
3 It was also shown in Lobb and Fraser (2002) that:   ) ( ) ( i d i o p p Õ Õ
<
> ; depending on the parameter 
values chosen.   12 
Section 3:  Analysis 
3.1  Case 1:   Domestic Deregulation of the Australian Wheat Market
4   
The Australian Wheat Board (AWB), was originally established as a temporary measure 
during  WWII,  “to  handle  wheat  marketing  as  a  war-time  emergency”  (AWB,  1999). 
These terms were formalised with the introduction of the Wheat Industry Stabilisation 
Act (WISA), (1948).  The act ensured the former AWB was the sole marketer and seller 
of Australian wheat on the domestic and export markets.  As described by Wait and 
Ahmadi-Esfahani (1996), prior to deregulation: 
 
All domestically produced wheat became the property of the AWB once it left the farm 
gate.  The Wheat (sic) was then taken to the AWB-appointed receiver in each State – the 
Bulk Handling Authorities (BHAs), which were statutory monopolies.  Growers were 
charged for the use of the services of the BHAs at the same amount per tonne regardless 
of the handling facility to which they delivered their wheat and the time of delivery 
within the season.   
(p 318). 
 
The preliminaries of deregulation followed the IAC’s reports
5 and the announcement by 
the Australian Federal Government (1985), that they were no longer willing or able to 
provide assistance to wheat producers in order to match the subsidies provided to farmers 
in other countries (www.prairecentre.org/wheataustralia.htm). The Wheat Marketing Act  
(WMA), (1984, 1989), was developed to replace WISA (1948). Changes included the 
removal of the provision of government underwriting of loans and price guarantees for 
the AWB as well as opening the domestic market to competition to increase internal and 
allocative efficiency. 
  
The deregulation process culminated with the signing of the WMA on 1
st July 1989.  The 
WMA imposed a new structure for the Australian wheat industry and the AWB became 
                                                 
4 See Lobb, 2002 for a more detailed analysis. 
5 See IAC Reports, 1977, 1978, 1984, 1988(a) & 1988(b).   13 
merely one of several players in the newly competitive domestic market.   Multinational 
companies  took  this  opportunity  to  enter  the Australian  market.   The companies that 
began marketing, trading and broking in the domestic market included Cargill, Conagara 
and Louis Dreyfus (Wait & Ahmadi-Esfahani, 1996, p 320).   Farmers were no longer 
restricted to selling solely to the AWB and now had marketing choices for domestic sales.  
Buyers  also  benefited  from  the  increased  competition  in  the  marketplace  (Wait  & 
Ahamadi-Esfahani, 1996, p 320).     
 
On a theoretical level, domestic market deregulation may have resulted in an increase in 
the elasticity of the AWB’s domestic demand as consumers would not be as constrained 
to purchasing wheat from the AWB as they had been prior to deregulation.  It is important 
to note that although this is a widely accepted theoretical construct there have been no 
studies examining the elasticity of demand for the domestic wheat market as the data 
required is deemed commercially sensitive and has not to date been released by marketing 
agents (Wait & Ahmadi-Esfahani, 1996, p 321).   
 
For this study, the increase in the elasticity of domestic demand is represented by a 0.1 
unit increase in bd to 1.4, from 1.3 in the base case. Costs and uncertainty are held the 
same as in the base case.  The elasticity of demand for the international market also 
remains unchanged.   
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Results 
Table  3.1.1A: Comparing sales maximisation results when bd is increased 
    Before* 
a  Before 




po  $32.90  $30.87 
pd  $27.30  $24.73 
QT  188.83  170.37 
E(P P P P)Total  $3298.32  $2576.06 
 
a Where ‘Before*’ indicates the scenario results from the full model version of 
the base case (as in table 2.1.1). 
 
As expected, the results in Table 3.1.1A indicate that an increase in the AWB’s elasticity 
of domestic demand, by weakening the expected profit constraint, will lead to a decline in 
both its overseas and domestic prices
6.  Note also that the domestic price has decreased by 
a greater amount than the overseas price as the revenue maximiser concentrates on using 
the weaker expected profit constraint to pursue increased sales revenue in the (now more 
responsive) domestic market. 
 
                                                 
6 Note that the expected utility of revenue maximiser will choose to lower prices until it is constrained by 
the expected profit constraint.  Because of this the first order conditions (focs), are not equal to zero for the 
expected utility of revenue maximiser.  However, the focs must equate in order for the best contribution to 
be made to increasing the expect utility of the revenue maximiser. 
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Table  3.1.1B: Comparing profit maximisation results when bd is increased 
    After*  After 




po  $41.03  $40.32 
pd  $42.49  $34.50 
QT  114.48  109.37 
E(P P P P)Total  $3473.42  $2711.71 
 
Table 3.1.1B again shows a decline in prices from the base case scenario.  The decrease 
in the domestic price is considerably larger than the decline in the overseas price and this 
decrease is also significantly greater than that in Table 3.1.1A above.  This reflects the 
greater  price  flexibility  associated  with  the  (unconstrained)  profit  maximiser. 
Nevertheless,  the  results  are  consistent  with  the  previous  findings  that  overseas  and 
domestic  prices  of  the  profit  maximiser  (after  scenario)  are  still  greater  than  for  the 
revenue maximiser (before scenario), and that the quantity for the profit maximiser is less 
than for the revenue maximiser (see hypotheses, section 1). 
 
These results suggest that if the effects of deregulation in the domestic wheat market 
appeared  in  advance  of  the  commercialisation  of  the  AWB  being  implemented  then 
domestic consumers would have seen this in terms of a decrease in domestic prices until 
the implementation of commercialisation brought about a price increase. Alternatively, if 
the impact of deregulation appeared in conjunction with the impact of commercialisation, 
then  no  such  price  cut  would  be  observed.  Rather,  the  extent  of  the  increase  in  the 
domestic price associated with commercialisation would simply have been reduced. 
   16 
3.2  Case 2:   Changes in Transport Costs
7 
The  Australian  transportation  industry  (road,  rail,  and  sea),  and  bulk  handling 
corporations  are  closely  linked  with  the  wheat  industry  as  they  provide  an  integral 
network  between  farmers  and  consumers.  Transportation  has  remained  a  key  cost 
component post deregulation of the AWB as the majority of wheat (85%) is destined for 
the  export  market  and  requires  transportation  from  receival  points  to  port  facilities.  
Domestic  wheat  sales  account  for  the  remaining  15%  where  the  principal  modes  of 
transport are rail and road. 
 
Domestic Costs 
There are two main stages of grain transportation.  Firstly, grain is transported from the 
farm to storage facilities (on average 17 kilometres), this cost is usually borne by the 
farmer (AWB Ltd, 2001a).  Secondly, wheat is transported from receival storage facilities 
to domestic customers or merchants (a national average of 350 kilometres), the costs of 
which are usually incurred by the marketer, AWB Ltd (AWB Ltd, 2001a).   
 
Road transportation is the largest component of domestic freight transport in Australia, 
65% of all freight moved in 1995/96 was by road and this figure has been increasing at 
6% per annum over the last few years (Austroads, 2000, p 15 -16).  Rail is the next largest 
mode of freight transportation with 26% of total freight hauled (Austroads, 2000, p 16).  
Rail  is  typically  used  for  non-perishable  bulk  commodities  such  as  minerals  or 
agricultural goods like wheat.   
 
Export Costs 
Exported bulk commodities, requiring shipment by sea, are particularly dependent on a 
low cost structure to ensure a competitive advantage. The majority of Australian wheat is 
sold ‘free on board’ (fob) with an increasingly large proportion (30%), of wheat sold as 
‘costs, insurance and freight’ (cif), (PC, 1998, pp 152).  Cif requires the AWB Ltd to 
charter a ship to pick up and deliver wheat for export to a specific buyer.  The AWB Ltd 
                                                 
7 Further details are available from Lobb, 2002   17 
is  responsible  for  all  port  authority  charges  including  government  levies,  stevedoring 
charges,  wharfage,  tonnage,  navigation  charges,  berthage  and  all  other  loading  and 
delivery costs (PC, 1998, pp 36).     
 
Prior  to  the  privatisation  of  the  AWB  Ltd,  nearly  all  wheat  was  sold  fob,  with  the 
importer  accountable  for  the  product  after  release  from  Bulk  Handling  Corporations 
(BHCs)  and  prior  to  loading
8.    As  a  result  of  fob  sales  and  operating  as  a  statutory 
marketing authority, the Australian Wheat Board had no contractual relationship with 
port authorities.  There was little or no incentive for shippers to rally for an increase in 
efficiency  as  costs  were  sustained  by  the  buyer  (IC,  1993,  pp154).    Potentially,  post 
deregulation, the AWB Ltd stood to benefit from waterfront reform by decreasing the cost 
margin included in the comparative price of Australian wheat.  The increase in cif sales 
also provided an incentive for AWB Ltd to demand highly efficient and low cost services.  
 
Data – domestic costs 
Data  for  the  changes  in  domestic  transport  costs  over  the  period  1988  till 2000  was 
calculated solely on rail freight price trends for wheat per tonne 1995-96 to 2000-01.  
Data  for  road  and  BHCs  costs  was  unobtainable.  Rail  data  was  compiled  from  a 
Productivity Commission (2002) report on “Trends in Australian Infrastructure Prices, 
1990-91 to 2000-01”.  The data represents the average cost of transporting wheat from 
storage to ports in each state (PC, 2002a, p 225). 
 
                                                 
8 This process is often referred to as ‘ex spout’ (PC, 1993, p 153, footnote 4).   18 
Table 3.2.1:  Real rail freight price trends – wheat (per tonne) 
    (Index 1996-97 = 100) 
  NSW  VIC  QLD  SA  WA  National 
1996-97  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1997-98  101.3  100.1  100.1  100  98.9  100 
1998-99  92.6  99.2  97.0  103.2  96.4  96.2 
1999-00  91.4  91.3  93.5  98.4  90.3  92.1 
2000-01  78.1  80.1  82.8  93.7  91.3  84.7 
 
Source:  PC estimates based on Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, Consumer Price Index, 




The data in Table 3.2.1, shows a 15.3% decline in national average transport costs of 
wheat per tonne between the years 1996-97 and 2000-01.  If this fall in costs was constant 
and consistent from 1988-89 one could assume, ceritus paribus, that costs have fallen by 
30.6% over the last decade. All elasticities and levels of uncertainty are held per the 
original base case. 
 
Data – export costs 
The data used in this paper for examining the port costs to the AWB Ltd has been taken 
from  these  reports  and  their  various  public  submissions.  As  a  result  of  the  material 
available  it  has  been  possible  to  estimate  the  port  and  related  government  charges 
associated with the export of bulk wheat, cif, out of various Australian ports.  Table 3.2.2 
shows the changes in average per tonne costs in Australian dollars and indicates that 
during the period 1992 to 2002 there has been a decline in costs of around 9.75%.  Costs 
                                                 
9 Note from PC (2002a): The real price index for each State reflects the average cost of transporting wheat 
from silos to the port.  The average is equal to the cost of transporting the grain from each silo, weighted by 
the tonnage of Export Pool grain moved from that site as a proportion of aggregate State tonnage of AWB 
Pool Grain to the port for export.   19 
are in A$ per tonne for 1992 and 2002 for a ship with a gross registered tonnage of 30000 
tonnes. 
 











PORT         
Brisbane  $2.53  $1.57  $0.96  3.44% 
Adelaide  $2.26  $1.79  $0.47  20.08% 
Port Lincoln  $2.28  $1.71  $0.57  25.00% 
Esperance  $2.48  $2.63  -$0.15  -6.05% 
Albany  $2.23  $2.06  $0.17  7.62% 
Kwinana  $1.06  $1.80  -$0.74  -69.81% 
Geraldton  $2.44  $2.23  $0.21  8.61% 
Average  $2.11  $1.97  $0.21  9.75% 
b Source:  IC, 1993, Table B8, p 216 
c Source:  Shipping Australia Ltd, 2002, Attachment C, p 7 
 
Reforms  are  continuously  and  simultaneously  occurring  in  both  the  wheat  and  the 
waterfront industries.  Hence lower port authority costs are due not only to the AWB 
Ltd’s attitude to costs, but also to increased efficiency on the waterfront.  It is difficult to 
distinguish  which  component  of  the  9.75%  decrease  over  the  period  1992-2002 time 
periods can be accounted for by changes in the AWB Ltd’s corporate structure or by an 
increase in efficiency in waterfront operations.  However, the fact that the AWB Ltd, 
prior to deregulation, traded in fob contracts suggests that the decline in costs must be 
accounted for as a result of the AWB Ltd’s change in corporate structure.   
 
 
It is important to note that domestic and overseas costs in the model are representative of 
total  marketing  costs  and  hence  a  proportion  of  these  total  selling  costs  needs  to  be   20 
allocated specifically to transport costs. The AWB Ltd, report that their ‘Site to Sea’ 
direct costs
10 are approximately 14%, and other marketing costs (pool management fees, 
insurance  and  demurrage  costs),  account  for  3%  of  their  National  Pool  for  2000-01 
(AWB, 2001b, p10).  Following from this, it can be inferred that transport costs, as a 
proportion of total costs, are to the order of  82% of total selling costs.  
 
Export costs for the AWB Ltd should also include domestic costs – that is, the transfer of 
wheat from the receival point to the port. In what follows it is assumed that for exported 
wheat the internal transport represents 67% of the total transport costs (that is, cd=10 and 
co=15).  Given that domestic costs have declined by 30% over the last decade, the figure 
used to represent the change in export costs for this time period is 23%.    
 
Modifying  these  statistics  to  take  into  account  the  proportion  of  costs  allocated  to 
transport  (82%),  domestic  transport  costs  represent  a  25%  decline  in  total  domestic 
selling costs and overseas transport costs represent a 19% decline in total export costs.  
Note that all elasticities and values of uncertainty are held  constant per the base case. 
 
                                                 
10 AWB Ltd defines these costs as: “direct costs paid from pool proceeds to service providers involved in 
the supply chain from up- country receivals sites to bulk wheat shipments, free on board” (AWB, 2001, p 
10).   21 
Results – transport costs 
 
Table 3.2.3A: Comparing sales maximisation results when costs are decreased 
(export costs down by 19%; domestic costs down by 25%) 
    Before*  Before 




po  $32.90  $26.84 
pd  $27.30  $20.15 
QT  188.83  268.88 
E(P P P P)Total  $3298.32  $3619.37 
 
The results in table 3.2.3A show a decrease in domestic and export prices when costs 
have been decreased in both markets.  Moreover, these decreases are proportionately in 
line with the decreases in costs.     
   
Table 3.2.3B: Comparing profit maximisation results when costs are decreased 
    After*  After 




po  $41.03  $34.43 
pd  $42.49  $32.18 
QT  114.48  159.16 
E(P P P P)Total  $3473.42  $3809.81 
 
In addition, the results in Table 3.2.3B  show a decline in the prices for both export and 
domestic wheat, and again these decreases are proportionately in line with the decreases 
in costs.    
   22 
Similar to the case of deregulation, these results suggest that if the effects of transport 
cost  reductions  appeared  in  advance  of  the  commercialisation  of  the  AWB  being 
implemented then domestic consumers would have seen this in terms of a decrease in 
domestic  prices  until  the  implementation  of  commercialisation  brought  about  a  price 
increase. Alternatively, if the impact of transport cost reductions appeared in conjunction 
with the impact of commercialisation, then no such price cut would be observed. Instead, 
the extent of the increase in the domestic price associated with commercialisation would 
simply have been reduced. 
 
3.3  Case 3:   Uncertainty in the International Arena
11 
The international trading arena has become increasingly unstable in light of fluctuating 
exchange  rates  and  general  economic  uncertainty  following  September  11
th  events  in 
2001 as well as financial upheaval throughout 2002.  However, throughout the 1990s 
there were two periods of global macroeconomic instability, firstly in 1991-93 and then 
1998-99 with an average growth rate of 3% (down from 3.5% in the 1980s and 4.5% in 
the 1970s (IMF, 1999, p 3).  The major reason for this instability was currency crises in 
Mexico,  Brazil,  Russia  and  Asia.    Many  economies  remained  surprisingly  stable 
throughout this period, namely the USA, Australia, China, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Taiwan (IMF, 1999, p4).  As a result, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(1999), believes that: 
 
It is unclear whether macroeconomic instability generally has been increasing.  However 
the mere fact that it has been pervasive may be considered surprising given the general 




For  the  purposes  of  this  study  a  measure  of  the  change  in  the  level  of  international 
uncertainty from 1988/89 to 1998/99 is taken by examining gold prices.  Gold is generally 
                                                 
11 For further details see Lobb, 2002.   23 
seen as a distinct and relatively stable commodity (less fluctuating than paper currencies), 
with a “universally acceptable storehouse of value” (Amey, 1998, p 50). Gold is both a 
commodity and a form of legal tender and it is this dichotomy that enables gold to be 
used as an indicator for world economic stability – “international political and economic 
events that may influence the market for gold as a commodity may be outweighed by 
developments perceived to favor (sic) gold as a medium of exchange” (Amey, 1998, p 
50).   
 
Results 
Following the above analysis
12 and based on fluctuations in the gold price as a proxy for 
international  uncertainty  it  is  assumed  that  uncertainty  in  the  overseas  market  has 
declined over the last decade by 33% (Amey, 1998, p 53). Costs, elasticities, and domestic 
uncertainty are held the same as in the base case scenario. 
 
Table 3.3.1A: Comparing sales maximisation results when uncertainty in 
the overseas market decreases (33%) 
    Before*  Before 




po  $32.90  $32.84 
pd  $27.30  $27.44 
QT  188.83  188.07 
E(P P P P)Total  $3298.32  $3301.05 
 
Table 3.3.1A shows a small decline in export prices and a small rise in domestic price as 
international  uncertainty  decreases.  These  results  follow  from  the  revenue  maximiser 
feeling less at risk generally and therefore willing to bear the increased risk associated 
with lowering prices in the more responsive market to increase expected revenue. 
                                                 
12 For further details see Lobb, 2002.   24 
 
Table 3.3.1B: Comparing profit maximisation results when uncertainty in 
the overseas market decrease (33%) 
    After*  After 




po  $41.03  $42.05 
pd  $42.49  $42.50 
QT  114.48  113.08 
E(P P P P)Total  $3473.42  $3475.02 
 
In  Table  3.3.1B  the  firm  adjusts  its  prices  upwards  to  reflect  the  decreased  demand 
uncertainty  in  the  overseas  market.  In  particular,  given  the  firm’s  risk  aversion,  the 
overseas market is perceived as more attractive, and the price set for that market is raised 
in the pursuit of increased expected profits even though this also increases the variability 
of profits.   
 
It  follows  that  as  the  AWB  Ltd  has  shifted  from  a  revenue  maximiser  to  a  profit 
maximiser changes in the level of international uncertainty can be expected to have had 
the opposite impact on price setting in the overseas market, with the revenue maximiser 
avoiding  risk  with  price  increases,  and  the  profit  maximiser  avoiding  risk  with  price 
decreases. 
 
Section 3.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
This section contains an evaluation of the robustness of the hypotheses regarding the 
impact  of  commercialisation  on  the  AWB’s  domestic  and  export  prices  to  the 
contemporaneous  occurrence  of  both  deregulation  and  decreased  costs  of  transport. 
Specifically,  although  it  was  found  in  sections  3.1  and  3.2  that the contemporaneous 
occurrence of each of these developments is sufficient only to diminish the extent of the   25 
positive impact of commercialisation on domestic and export prices, Tables 3.4.1A and 
3.4.1B  together  show  that  these  hypotheses  are  not  robust  to  the  contemporaneous 
occurrence  of  both  developments.  In  particular,  although  with  both  developments 
occurring at the same time as commercialisation there continues to be a small increase in 
the export price, the Tables show that the domestic price decreases (that is, $27.30 to 
$26.06).  
 
 Moreover  Table  3.4.1C  evaluates  the  sensitivity  of  this  finding  to  the  level  of  the 
expected  profit  constraint  on  the  revenue  maximiser,  which  has  been  set  at  95%  of 
maximum expected profits in the previous analysis, but which is weakened to 90% of 
maximum expected profits in this Table. These results show that a weakening of the 
expected profit constraint on the revenue maximiser restores the positive impact on prices 
of commercialisation regardless of the contemporaneous occurrence of deregulation and 
transport  cost  decreases  (for  example,  the  domestic  price  increases  from  $23.61  to 
$26.06). It follows that the impact of commercialisation on the AWB’s prices may have 
been positive or negative depending both on the associated developments of deregulation 
and cost decreases, and on the weakness of the expected profit constraint on the AWB’s 
pricing policies prior to commercialisation. In particular, the weaker was this constraint, 
the  more  likely  it  was  that  both  export  and  domestic  prices  increased  with 
commercialisation, regardless of the associated developments.    
   26 
Table    3.4.1A:  Comparing  revenue  maximisation  results  when  bd  is 
increased and costs have declined in both markets 
    Before*  Before 
  bo=1.5 
bd=1.3 
 
po  $32.90  $24.91 
pd  $27.30  $18.75 
QT  188.83  245.57 
E(P P P P)Total  $3298.32  $2883.88 
 
 
Table  3.4.1B: Comparing profit maximisation results when bd is increased 
and costs have declined in both markets. 
    After*  After 
  bo=1.5 
bd=1.3 
 
po  $41.03  $34.03 
pd  $42.49  $26.06 
QT  114.48  154.54 
E(P P P P)Total  $3473.42  $3035.11 
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Table  3.4.1C: Comparing revenue maximisation results with the expected 
profit constraint set at 90% of maximum expected profits.  (Other changes 
are the same as Table 3.4.1.A)  
    Before*  Before 
  bo=1.5 
bd=1.3 
 
po  $28.85  $22.02 
pd  $23.61  $16.48 
QT  228.60  294.66 




This paper has investigated of the effects of internal deregulation, transport costs and 
international  uncertainty  on  the  AWB  Ltd’s  pricing  behaviour  in  the  context  of  the 
commercialisation  of  the  AWB  Ltd,  where  this  shift  is  modelled  as  a  change  in  its 
objectives from a revenue to a profit maximiser.  The results of the above analyses are 
evaluated in relation to the developed hypotheses and indicate the impact of recent wheat 
industry developments on hypothetical prices.   In particular, it has been shown that the 
general effect of commercialisation has been an increase in both domestic and overseas 
prices. However, during the 1990s in association with commercialisation the Australian 
wheat industry also experienced deregulation of the domestic market, a decline in wheat 
transport  costs  and  a  decrease  in  world  market  uncertainty.  Based  on  the  simulation 
results it has been suggested that because both deregulation and lower transport costs 
have acted to decrease domestic and export prices, their contemporaneous occurrence 
with  commercialisation  will  have  ameliorated  to  some  extent  the  price  increases 
associated with commercialisation, and may have even dominated this impact depending 
on the extent to which the AWB’s profit constraint was binding on its pricing behaviour 
prior to commercialisation. In addition, it was found that the commercialisation of the   28 
AWB has resulted in a reversal of the impact of changes in world market uncertainty on 
the overseas price set by the AWB.    
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